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Summary findings
Many agricultural  regions in the developing  world are  The results  indicate that agricultural  households
subject  to severe droughts,  which can have devastating  exhibit significant  risk-avoidance  behavior, and that
effects on household incomes  and consumption,  even though they may use a range of risk management
especially  for the poor. To protect consumption,  rural  strategies,  there still remains  an unmet demand for
households  engage in many different risk management  insurance  against  drought risks.  The study did not
strategies  - some mainly  risk-reducing  and some simply  estimate the likely  costs of supplying  drought insurance,
coping devices  to protect consumption  once income has  but the latent demand in the study region is strong
been lost. An important limitation  of these traditional  enough to more than cover Lhe  breakeven  rate of
risk management  strategies  is their inability  to insure  approximately  the pure risk coist  (the probability of
against covariate risks.  And they are costly. The absence  drought) plus 5 percent administration  costs.
of formal credit and insurance  institutions,  which offer  The findings confirm.  the inadequacies  of traditional
an efficient  alternative  by overcoming  regional  strategies of coping with droughts in poor rural areas.
covariance  problems  and reducing  the cost of risk  Because  of the catastrophic and simultaneous  effects of
nminagement,  amounts to a market failure.  Past research  droughts on all households  over large areas, there is
has paid much more attention to the supply-side  reasons  limited scope for spreading risks effectively  at the local
for this market failure  than to the demand side question  level. Either households  must increase their savings
of whether there exist financial  instruments that farmers  significantly  (a problem with low average incomes  and
want and would be willing  to pay for.  an absence of safe and convenient savings  instruments),
Gautam, Hazell,  and Alderman  use  a dynamic  or more effective  risk management aids are needed that
household model  to examine  the efficiency  of drought  can overcome the covariation  problem. Improved
management  strategies  used by peasant  households.  An  financial  mark-ets  (with both credit and savings  facilities)
attractive  feature of the method is that it exploits  actual  could be helpful, particularly if they intermediate over a
production (input-output)  data and does not deal with the  larger and more diverse economic  base than the local
usually  unreliable  data on household consumption  and  economy. Alternatively,  formal drought insurance in the
leisure  activities.  The model is applied to a two-year panel  form of a drought (or rainfall) lottery might be feasible,
of data on households  from five  villages  in Tamil Nadu  and the results suggest  that it could be sold on a full-
(South  India). The sample  is small,  but the data are  cost basis.
special,  as one of the two years  was a severe drought year.
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Many agricultural  regions in the developing  world are subject to severe droughts, which can have
devastating  effects on household incomes  and consumption,  particularly  for the poor.  In order to protect
their consumption,  rural households  engage  in a variety of risk management  strategies  (Walker  and Jodha,
1986; Madon, 1991). Some of these are primarily  risk-reducing  in nature (e.g., income diversification,
intercropping,  farm fragmentation  and seasonal  migration), while others are coping  devices designed  to
protect consumption once income losses have occurred (e.g., borrowing from local stores and money
lenders, drawing down food stocks, selling assets and participation  in govenmment  relief programs).
Alderman and Paxson (1992)  present evidence  on the ability  of households  to effectively  pmtect
consumption  against  exogenous  income  shocks. One  general conclusion  is thathouseholds are collectively
unable to insure against covariate  risks. This feature  of drought damage  -the simultaneous  effect  on most
households  within a region - is an important  limitation of many traditional risk nmamgement  strategies.
During droughts, many households seek credit at the same time, leading to increases in local interest
rates. Similarly, local wages may be driven  down  by a surge of labor supply combined  with a contraction
of demand.  Farmers may also face a buyers' market for their assets in a drought year but a sellers'
market in a post-drought  year making it difficult  to replenish assets  liquidated  under stress (Jodha, 1975).
To overcome the covariability  problem requires  risk-sharing  arrangements  that cut across regicns that do
not experience droughts simultaneously. Few informal arrangements can accomplish  this  (with the
exception  of seasonal  migration and agricultural  trader credit).
Another important  limitation  of traditional  risk management  strategies is their cost. For example,
diversification  pursued as a risk management  aid reduces average incomes; credit borrowed in drought
years must be repaid with interest; maintaining  food stocks involves  storage costs and losses; temporarily
liquidating  assets is costly due to capital losses as noted above; and off-farm work may entail a cost in
terms of potential additional farm income foregone.
1Formal credit and insurance  institutions  can pool risks across large and diversified  portfolios and,
in principle, offer an efficient way of overcoming  regional covariance  problems and reducing  the cost of
risk management. These institutions, however, are rarely weIl-developed  in the developing world and
their absence  amounts to a market failure.  Research  on the reasons for this market failure has paid much
more attention to supply-side problems (moral hazard, set-up costs, etc.,  cf. Hazell, Pomareda and
Valdds, 1986)  that limit the spread of formal credit and insurance  instruments than to the demand-side
questions  of whether there are financial instruments  that farmers want and would be willing to pay for
on a full-cost basis. If dhe  latter can be demonstrated,  then governments may have a key role to play in
either  helping private banking  and insurance institutions  overcome  supply-side  constraints, or in offering
these services  themselves. 1
Tne primary objective in this paper is to develop a model to determine if there is any latent
demand for insurance  by poor rural households against extreme  outcomes such as droughts. If existing
risk-management  strategies are inadequate in the sense that households exhibit an unmet demand for
insurance, potential Pareto gains may be possible should alternative income or consumption  smoothing
mechanisms  be identified.  An alternative that this paper explores is a hypothetical drought insurance
scheme in the form of a drought (or rainfall)  lottery described in Appendix A.
Defining  welfare as the expected  value of the sum of discounted  lifetime utilities of consumption
and leisure, dynamic  programming is used to set up an inter-temporally  separable household  model. The
dynamic equilibrium  conditions  are used  to derive the benefits  and costs associated  with ex-ante  household
decisions. These conditions  help in deriving empirical relationships  that allow consistent estimation of
key behavioral  parameters. A distinctive  feature of the approach  used here is that the parameters  needed
'The latter  should  not be confused  with government  programs  that  are essentially  income  transfers,  e.g.,
relief  employment,  food  rations  and subsidized  crop isurance. While  there  is undoubtedly  a need  for some  of
these  programs  in many  poor  rural areas,  the  focus  here  is on facilitating  the spread  of risk-management
mstruments  on purely  economic  grounds. Of  course,  successful  instruments  would  also help  reduce  the  need for
welfare  assistance.
2to  assess the  efficiency of  existing risk-management strategies can be  obtained without explicitly
specifying  a utility function. The method  yields a parsimonious  empirical model, which requires detailed
data only on production activities;  such data are often  more accessible  and reliable than consumption  data.
The focus here is on the latent demand for drought insurance.  This demand is likely to be
determined  jointly by risk behavior and the ability  of households  to smooth welfare over states of nature.
No attempt is made to distinguish or identify 'pure  risk attitudes, say by estimating  the Arrow-Pratt risk
aversion coefficients  (Binswanger, 1981; Antle, 1987).  Instead, a model which explicitly accounts for
various risk-management  mechanisms  is used to empirically  test for thejoint hypothesis of risk avoidance
and welfare smootiing.
The model is applied to a two-year panel from the IFRI.-TNAU 2 household survey of five
villages in the North Arcot district of Tamil Nadu, India.  Although the sample is small, the data are
appropriate to the question as the region suffered a severe drought in the first year of the survey, with
rainfall levels above  the long-run average the following year.  The estimates are used to derive implied
premia that sample households  might be willing  to pay for a hypothetical  drought insurance  scheme. The
empirical application  is intended to be mainly demonstrative  due to data limitations. The results obtained
here complement an application of a similar method to data from Burkina Faso (Sakurai, et al., 1994).
The plan of the paper is as follows: the next section describes  the problem under study; the third
section briefly reviews the solution principle for a multiperiod consumption  problem; the fourth section
develops  a household model with drought risks; the fifth section derives  efficiency  conditions  for the risk-
management  strategies currently available  to households;  the sixth section is concerned  with the empirical
application  of the model with sub-sections  that describe  the data, present the econometric  procedures and
discuss the results; and the final section summariz  and concludes.
21FTRI  is thme  Itrntinal  Food  Policy  Research  Institute,  Washington  D.C., and TNAU  is the  Tamil  Nadu
Agriculturd  University,  Tamil  Nadu, india.
3The Problem
To  conceptualize  the sequential decision making process for an  agricultural household, each
production  period (i.e., the agricultural year) is divided into tv ;- stages: stage I corresponds to the time
between  planting and harvesting, and stage II corresponds  to the time from harvesting to the start of the
next planting season.  Each stage is different in tenns of its decision-making  environment  and the nature
of the problem faced by the household.
At the beginning of stage I, a household is endowed with a level of resources carried over as a
result of previous actions.  Frequent occurrence of droughts makes future income, and hence future
welfare, of the household uncertain.  It has to decide on how to allocate resources between current
consumption,  (recautionary) savings, and production  in order to attain  a plan that maximizes  its welfare.
These decisions  are assumed  to be made at the beginning  of stage I and, hence, will be conditioned  only
on information available at the beginning of stage L.
The resources available  to the household include  a fixed labor endowment, an initial  level of fixed
capital, an initial level of savings, and initial disposable  income.  Fixed capital stock is combined with
variable inputs (abor  and working capital) in stage I to produce agricultural income that is realized in
stage Ji.  Ihe  production outcome is subject to uncertain weather, makig  the stage I decision-making
environment  risky.  In response to this uncertainty, the household resorts to risk-management  stategies
in an attempt to maintain a desired balance  between expected  income and income risk.
Ihe  ex ante (stage  I) risk-management  strategies include  risk-reducing  actions such as diversifying
investment of given resources (labor and capital) across farm and non-farm income sources, and within
farm income  diversifying  across crops, fields and technologies. This 'self-insurance,' however, is bought
at the cost of lower expected income.  The 'premium' associated with, for example, risk-induced crop
diversification is the expected income foregone by not adopting a profit-maximizing  cropping patten.
Other ex ante strategies include precautionary savings.  These savings tie up scarce capital in a liquid
4form at the cost of Iforegone  production opportunties.
In stage  II the outcome  of stage I decisions  is realized. With weather-related  uncertainty resolved,
the decision-making  environment  at this stage is certain. For simplicity, shocks are modelled as binary
outcomes, namely 'non-drought' and 'drought': in the event of a non-drought year, anticipated income
is realized; in the event of a drought year, realized income suffers a downward shock.  The household
responds  to such shocks  with risk-coping  mechanisms  such as obtaining  temporary off-farm employment,
drawing down savings, and borrowing to smooth consumption.
It should be reiterated that stage II risk-coping  actions are ex post in nature.  While decisions in
this stage will be dependent on the outcome of stage  I, they cannot influence  that outcome  per se.'  The
primary role of various risk-oping  devices  is to cushion income shortfalls in the same way that savings
do.  However, under the assumption of rational intertemporal behavior, the ability of households to
smooth consumption  ecx  post is expected  to influence ex ante risk behavior. For example, if households
know that they can obtain moderately priced consumption credit in the event of a drought, they are
unlikely to pursue risk-reducing strategies in stage I that are more costly in terms of expected income.
In  control parlance this forward-looking nature of decision making calls for  a  closed-loop
solution.  Dynamic programming provides such solutions to multi-period problems, and Bellman's
Principle of Optimality (Bellman, 1957) ensures that decision rules obtained by this approach will be
optimal  at each stage, irrespective  of the realization  of future outcomes. Thus, assuming that households
are aware of their options (i.e., risk-coping  devices)', the efficiency  of existing risk-management  devices
can be used to determine their costs in smoothing welfare over stage II outcomes.  This cost of self-
insurance  can then be used to determine  whether  there is any demamd  for more cost-efficient  alternatives.
3Although, they will influence stage I decisions  of thefollowing  year.
'In case the household is unaware of its fxture options, the situation corsponds  to an open-loop decision
framework. In such circumstances,  what the household  can or cannot do in the future is irrelevant for current
decision  maling, and the dynamic optimiztion model reduces to a static optimization  modeLSolving an Inter-temporal Utility Maximization Problem
For expositional  purposes, consider the following general tine-separable lifetime consumption
planing  problem:
J
max(,,  E,-  &' U(CI)(1
t-1
subject to
W'1=  (l+r)  (W,-C,) +Y,  (2)
BIE r-  l  t ,-ytr)=  W,  (3)
where t denotes  the time period, E, denotes expectations  conditioned  on inibrmation available  at time t,
U(.) is an atemporal  utility function, T is the terminal time period of the planning horizon, C, represents
total consumption during period t, Wf is opening or initial wealth for period t, Y, is stochastic income
generated in period t, 6 is the rate at which future utility is discounted, and r is the rate of interest on
savings.  Equation (2) is the dynamic counterpart  of a standard static budget constraint and equation (3)
is a solvency constraint (see Dardanoni, 1991, for a concise historical development  of this model).
Define V,(.) as the maximum  value function  at t, i.e., (1) evaluated  at the optimal  solution vector
{C,.  The existence  of a unique solution to (1) can been shown under appropriate  regularity conditions
(Stokey and Lucas, 1989). In principle, given initial conditions (W) at each time period t,  C, will be
a function of W, and the various parameters of the maximization  problem in (1) subject to (2) and (3)
(Samuelson,  1969, and Hakansson, 1970, provide explicit  solutions for some common  utility fimctions).
The value function V,(.), as a function of C(W),  will in trn  be a function of initial wealth and the
parameters  of the intertemporal  maximization  problem. It can been shown that V(WJ is a differentiable
6function under very general conditions  (Benveniste  and Scheinkann, 1979)5.
Using dynamic  programming, substitute  the value function representing  the utility maximization
problem for period t+ 1 in (1) to obtain the t  period dynamic recursion
V (W,)  - max4,U(C,)  EVy(W1*t.))  (4)
Solving (4) subject to (2), gives the first-order conditions
u'  (C,)  e r6EV'  (W[, 1)  (5)
Using the envelope condition, it can be shown that, at the optimum,
U' (c  (W,) )  =V  (W,)  (6)
for all t.  Advancing  the time subscript in (6) to t+ I and substituting  in (5) yields the Euler equation for
consumption:
U'(C 1P)  =  rJEr6  (CO, 1 )  (7)
Equation (7) implies that, at the optimum, the marginal  utility of current consumption  will be equated to
expected  discounted marginal  utility of future consumnption.
While  (7) characterizes the intertemporal equilibrium, a closed-form solution for  C; in the
presence of uncertainty  is in geneaml  not possible (see Zeldes, 1989a;  Hayashi, 1985). Empirical studies
dealing with intertemporal  consumption  problems with unceraint  have thus relied on Euler conditions
(7) to test for theoretical  restrictions on implied  behavioral  conditions  (Zeldes, 19B9b;  Morduch, 1990).
This analysis will exploit  the implied optimality conditions  (5) for a household model to derive
relations that allow for a simple procedure  to esfimate  the behavioral  parameters of interest.  As will be
apparent later, the main advantage  of this approach is that it circumvents  the need to explicitly specify
5mese  conditions require  that the  solution set be convex, that the primal utility fimction  be differentiable
and  concave, that  an optimal solution  path exists and  that the solution,  given initial conditions,  is feasible. For
the present study, these conditions  are assumed.
7consumption  preferences. The resulting relationships  are parsimonious  in data requirements  and model
specification. In particular, the method will not require data on consumption  or savings, which are often
unavailable  or unreliable.  Infbrxnation  on actual production decisions is used to 'recover' preferences
revealed  by households during their normal course of activity.
A Household Model
Before  applying  the dynamic  model represented  by (4), the time subscript 't' needs to be carefully
interpreted to avoid confusion about the relevant decision periods.  Earlier, the agricultural year was
divided  into two distinct sub-periods, stage I and stage H. These stages are the appropriate time periods
for this analysis.  Hence the time subscript 't' represents one 'stage' of an agricultural year and 't+ 1'
the immediately  following 'stage'.  Further, since the model must hold for all time periods, notation can
be simplified  by replacing t and t+ 1 by 1 and 2, respectively.
Next note that this analysis is limited to stage I decisions (and henceforth 1 refers to stage I).
Stage  II decisions are ex post, made in response  to realized outcomes. With uncertainty resolved, stage
H decisions are not appropriate to model ex ante behavioral response to weather-related  risks.  This is
not to imply that stage  II decisions are not relevant  to the current problem or that they are ignored in the
model. The fact that stage It decisions will be conditional  on, and hence affected  by, stage I decisions
is fully accounted  for by the dynamic programming approach  used to solve the household problem.
A household derives utility from the consumption  of goods and leisure (see Singh, Squire and
Strauss, 1986, on household models).  Using the dynamic programming recursion (4), the household's
problem may be written as
V(WI)  = Kaxc.a  [  U(Cl, 1 1)  +  6E1V(W2) J  I8)
where V(W.) is the value function representing optimal household welfare at time i,  C 1 is period 1
8consumption  of goods,  41  is period  1 leisure,  El denotes  expectation  taken  over  the distribution  of random
period 2 opening  wealtfi,  with  subsCLipt  1 signifying  that expectations  are based  only on information
available  at the beginnming  of period 1, and B  is the  rate at which  the household  discounts  ftture welfare.
Assume droughts occur with a  strictly positive probability 'q'  in  each period, but  are
independendy  and identically  distributed  over time. The complete  household  problem  for stage  I may
thus  be stated  as
V(W 1)  =  MaXz[U (Cu,11)  +  (l-C)V(W2.)  +9V(W2)  (9)
where
C1 C Yo+B1 +wL0 1 -k 1 -SI-pX 1 (10)
1I  =  (Lfl  11)
W2d=  Y2d+S, + 1 -h 2 (B 1 )  (312)
=2  Y2,+Sl-h 2 (B1)  (13)
Y2n=  7rYY(Zf,k 1,Dl)  (14)
Y2d = Y2,jI-u(Dl,X)  ],  0￿u1L  (15)
Z,  =  [DI,L.llLfvkl SIrIllBl]J  (16)
where  Z, in (16)  represents  the vector  of period 1 decision  variables. The first term in (9) represents
instantaneous  utility  from  period 1  consumption  of goods  and  leisure. Goods  consumption,  CL,  is defined
9in equation  (10)  as  the difference  between  total  resources  at  the  household's  disposal  in period  1 and  total
diversions  of income  to uses  other  than  current  consumption.  The componens.  of  this budget  identity  are
defined  as follows:  Y. represents  pro-determined  or exogenous  resources  available  in period 1 (e.g..
opening  wealth,  previous  savings,  fixed  transfers,  etc.), B, is period 1 borrowing,  Ld is off-farm  labor
supplied  in period 1 at market  wage  rate w, k1 is non-labor  production  expenditure  or working  capital,
S, is period 1 saving,  and  pl, is the (hypothetical)  insurance  premium  that  the household  would  choose
to pay if such  a scheme  were  to be made  available.  This premium  is defined  as a proportion,  p, of the
total indemnity,  I,, that  the household  wishes  to insure  against  a drought-year  outcome. Equation  (11)
represents  the time constraint  facing the household. Xrith  a fixed endowment  of total time, I  this
constraint  uniquely  determines  leisure as a residual  of on-farm,  Lfl, and off-farm,  L.,, labor supply
decisions.
The second  term in the objective  fmnction  (9)  represents  the expected  discounted  maximum  value
function  summarizing  future  welfare. The expectation  has been  made  explicit  by assuming  (1-a as the
probability  of non-drought  outcome  yielding  fann income  Y 2, in period  2, and q as the probability  of a
drought  outcome  yielding  farm  income  Y2 in period  2.  As noted  earlier,  consumption  in period  2 will
be a function  of period 2 initial endowment,  W2,  which  evolves  according  to equations  (12) and (13)
under drought  and non-drought  conditions,  respectively.  In a drought  year, Wd will be the sum of
realized  drought  farm  income,  Y2a,  savings  carried  over  from period  1, SI, indemnity  received  from  the
hypothetical  insurance  scheme,  II, less repayment  of accumulated  period 1 debt,  B,, determined  by the
repayment  schedule  h(.).  In the event of a non-drought  year W2,  will be realized  income,  Ya2,  plus
savings  S,, less repayment  of debt  h%B). In its simplest  form,  h(B 1) can be written  as (1+r)B 1 where
r is the borrowing  rate of interest.
Equation  (14)  defines  non-drought  or anticipated  farm  income  as the product  of anticipated  value
per-unit  of output,  jr, and anticipated  total  production.  The latter  is defined  as a whole-farm  production
10finction Y(.).  On-farm labor, Li,  working capital, k,, and diversification (across crops), D1, are the
variables used to control production output.
Drought-year  farm income, equation (15), is defined  as anticipated  income reduced by a random
shock, u(.).  This production shock is assumed to be  affected by risk-reducing strategies such as
diversification. It will also be a fimction  of fixed (in the short run) household and farm characteristics,
X.  It is hypothesized  that efficient diversification  will reduce realized shocks.
Note that, for simplicity, savings, S1, are assumed  to be purely precautionary  in nature, i.e., they
do not earn any real rate of return.  It is thus assumed that savings take the form of unproductive cash
holdings.  Note, however, that non-zero interest rates, as may be relevant to specific applications, can
be easily accommodated  in the model as negative borrowing.
The foilowing assumptions  are maintained  for the rest of this analysis: the utility function U(.)
is  increasing and  concave in  its  arguments; the  maximal value function V(.)  is  increasing and
differentiable;  the production function Y(.) is increasing and concave in variable inputs Ln and k,, and
the repayment fimction is an increasing function of accumulated  debt, i.e., OhfIB 1 Ž 0, to signify non-
negative  costs of borrowing.
Characterizing the Equilibrium
Differentiating  the model (9)-(15) with respect to the Zf variables, the first-order conditions for
11an equilibrium are
Ov (P4)=  (1-q)V2.WrYn  + qV2d  (1-u)  7rY,rYu,  ]  =  0  (17)
aav(w)  =  (18)
8=  +Ui  +[(1q)V4Y4+gVLca-u)fr4  ]  =  0  (19)
8v(FV,)  I  (20)I
-. (a)  -u  +  6[(i-q)vt+qV2d]  =  o  (20)
avV(W,+  [(3-q)V2'ry',+qV2d(l-u)ry'l  =  0  (21)
p4  =  6qV2-  =0  (22)
=  DE,-  6[  CI-q)VL4  + qVLh']  = o  (23)
where primes ()  denote derivatives of functions  with respect to the arguments  denoted as subscripts. In
particular note that  V2;'= avW 2.JI8Wh  and VY 2 '  is similarly defined.
Condition (17) states that, at the margin, expected  benefits will be equated to expected costs of
diversification.  Condition (18) states that off-farm labor will be supplied up to the point where the
marginal  disutility of labor is exactly  offset by the utility value of marginal labor earnings, i.e., wage  rate
weighted by the marginal utility of consumption.  Conditions (19)0i23) state the familiar result that
marginal utility of current consumption  (of goods and leisure) will be equated to the discounted expected
marginal  utility of wealth (and, by the envelope condition, to the discounted  expected  marginal utiity of
future consumption).
12Simple manipulation  of the first-order conditions  yields equilibrium relationships that provide
useful insights into the cost-efficiency  of the risk-management strategies used by households.  They also
suggest a framework that can be fruitfully used for empirical analysis.
Before proceeding further, define:
i-q  (1-g)  w  (24)
which, for a given q (the actuarial probability  of drought), measures the utility tradeoff between drought
and non-drought outcomes, i  =  V'2|VN' 2 1 , and can be used as a measure of the potential demand for
insurance against drought risks.  Note that , measures  both (i) the ability  of the household  to absorb risk
and (ii) attitudes to risk.  This is because the magnitude  of 4b  depends both on the expected  deviation of
W2d  from W2, as welt as the curvature of the indirect utility function V(.), which reflects risk attitudes.
Even for a risk-averse household, it is possible to obtain ,1  if the household is able to absorb any
drought shock by means of other actions which ensure W2d=W2,. A more intuitive way to interpret +
in (724)  is to consider it as a ratio of marginal  utility weighted  probabilities  of drought (q) to non-drought
(I-qj  outcomes. Thus, ql will be equal to q when 4= 1 and the household will not exhibit any demand
for external insurance (whether  or not it is risk neutral).
Proceeding with the derivation of the equilibrium  relationships, using (24), equation (17) can be
13rewritten as
-7FYAE  1t@ ( 1-U  )J]  =  ¢-07rYUL  (25)
Using (18), equating (19) and (20) yields
w( 1+]  = WY(,[1+0 (3-u)]  (26)
Equating (20) and (21) yields
7rY(,[1+0(1-u)]  = 14*  (27)
Combining (21) and (22) gives
p1YI[1+*(-l-u)  I  = *  (28)
Finally, using (21) and (23) gives
h1 (1+4)  = 7rY(,t+  (1-u)J]  (29)
In each equality (5)-(29),  the left-hand  side gives the marginal cost and the right-hand side the
marginal benefit associated with decision variables D1, Ln, S1, II  and B 1, respectively.  Note that in
equilibrium the benefits and costs associated with each decision are evaluated in terms of their relative
effects on future utility; as a result the discount rate drops out in deriving (2){9).
Condition (25) states that diversification, D1, entails a cost by reducing anticipated production
(OYIaD, <  0) in both non-drought and drought years.  These losses, weighted by 1 and 0 for the non-
drought and drought years, respectively, are offset by the marginal utility benefit accrued in drought
years in the form of a reduced income shock (auIaD <  0).
Condition (26) states that the expected  marginal benefit of labor use in agricultral  production
is equated at the margin with its opportunity  cost, the 'effective marginal returns to off-farm labor, i.e.,
the market wage rate weighted by the expected  marginal utility of wealth. This condition reiterates the
intuitive result that riskiness in agricultral  production makes (certain) off-farm wage income more
14attractive, leading to a reduction in the use of labor on farm.
According to condition (27), the marginal cost of savings is the value of output foregone by
diverting resources  from production  to liquid reserves. T.he  marginal  benefit is the weighted  non-drought-
and drought-year  utility value of marginal savings carried into the next period.
Condition (28) states that the marginal cost of the hypothetical insurance will be the production
foregone  by diverting resources to pay fr  the insurance premium. With p as the premium rate, output
will be reduced  by p times the productivity of the marginal  unit of capital diverted from production. The
benefit of insurance will be the drought-year  utility derived  from the marginal  unit of indemnity  received.
Insurance  benefits and costs closely resemble those associated  with savings; in fact, savings can
be interpreted as an indigenous insurance scheme.  The relative cost efficiency is, however, a priori
ambiguous. Using (27) and (28), it is seen that insurance will be cost-efficient  relative to savings only
if
1 -p)  WY,,  I+0  (  -u)  I  >  1  (30?
Ihe marginal  cost associated  with borrowing  inperiod 1 is the reduction in weighted  non-drought-
and drought-year marginal values of resources available to finance consumption in period 2.  The
reduction in resources will, at the margin, depend on the slope of the repayment schedule, W'.  The
margin;  benefit of borrowing is  the utlity  value of the marginal productivity of capital used in
production.  The  intuition behind this  equilibrium condition is that borrowing to  finance current
consumption  helps to keep an equivalent amount of capital in productive use, which at the margin
increases output at its current level of productivity.  If borrowing is used to finance production, e.g.
buying !ertilizer, then the marginal benefit of borrowing in terms of the marginal productivity  of capital
is more transparent
The efficiency  of risk-management  strategies to mitigate drought risk can be indicated  using the
parameters in (25)-(29). To evaluate the efficiency  of an insurance scheme of the type considered here,
15note  that (27)  and (28)  imply
p  =  0_  (31)
(1+0)
which is the premium rate at which a household will be indifferent between purchasing insurance and
holding liquid reserves.  It is simple to verifr that while a household which has efficiently  diversified its
risks, or is risk-neutral, will be indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing an actuarially fair
insurance', it will be willing to purchase drought insurance at a subsidized  rate, i.e., at a premium rate
less than q.  It is also straight-forward  to confirm the intuitive result that more risk-averse households
will be willing to pay a larger insurance  premium
8p  q  1  >0  (32)
where the strict inequality  follows from the assumption  of a stricdy positive  probability  of drought in each
rime period, i.e, q >  0.
Empirical Application
The empirical approach adopted here follows from a literature which infers risk attitudes from
risk-avoidance  behavior in agricultural production (Moscardi and de Janviy,  1977; Anile, 1987,1989).
We depart from such studies in that we directly use information on drought shocts  experienced by
households  in a structural model of farm income risk.  In addition, we incorporate  the use of non-farm
risk smoothing in household risk management strategies to test for the latent demand for drought
insurance.
"Sincev=  V'iV'  = 1 implis (from24)) that  q  =  q1(1Iq),  which  in tun implies  p  q  = q.
16Data
The data used for the empirical application come from to the IFPRI-TNAU  household survey
conducted over the period 1982-84 (see Hazell and Ramasamy, 1991, for a detailed description of the
data, the survey design and of the study region). Intially designed  for one year (1982-83), the survey
was extended for an additional  year (1983-84)  after the first year turned out to be a severe drought year7.
A two-stage sampling approach was adopted: in the first stage 1  1 representative villages were
identified, and in the second stage a stratified random sample of households was drawn from these
villages.  The first-year survey covered a total of 345 rural households- Due to resource constraints  the
resurvey was planned to cover only 75 of the original households  from 5 villages that were most affected
by the drought.  Of this sub-sample, 36 were agricultural producers; complete panel informatiot,
however, is available only for 32 households. This is the sample used for the empirical analysis.
All survey villages lie in the North Arcot district in the northwest of Tamil Nadu state in southern
India. The region is densely  populated (350  persons  per square kilometer) and poor -both absolutely  and
relative  to other regions in Inlia - with an annual  income equivalent  of US$95/capita  compared with the
national average of US$260/capita.  The region is dominated by small, fanily  farms averaging 1.2
hectares.  Paddy and groundnut are the main crops, followed by millet, sorghum and pulses.
The district enjoys two monsoons: the southwest monsoon from June to  September and the
northeast monsoon from October to December.  The northeast monsoon is relatively more important,
providing about 60 percent of the total annual rainfall.  In harmony with these rainfall patterns, the
agricultural year  (June-May) is  divided into three  cropping seasons, namely samba,  navarai and
sornavari.  The samba (rainy season) crop is the main crop, sown in July-August and harvested in
December-January. The navarai crop coincides  with the dry season and depends entirely on irrigation
7Annual rainfall  for 1982-83 was 751 -m  as compared to the average rainfall of  1032 mm over the perod
1961-62  to 19B485.  It has also be described  as one of the 9 worst rainfill years since 1901 (Rodgers and
Svendsen,  1991).
17It stretches  from December-January  to May. The sornavaraL  crop extends  from June  to September  and
encompasses  the light, southwest  monsoon.
Almost  all  households  in the retained  sample  have  access  to irrigation.  The  main  sources  of water
are tanks or small reservoirs  (33 percent)  and wells (60 percent). Access  to irrigation  allows  almost
continuous  cropping  of  the  land  throughout  the year. Ironically,  this  dependence  on irrigation  accenuated
the effects  of the 1982-83  drought  While 1981-82  was a normal  year, it was insufficient  to recharge
groundwater  reserves  after  the drought  of 1980-81,  making  even  the households  that  rely on irrigation
prone to drought.  Thus the insurance offered by irrigation was limited in 1982-83.
Access to irrigation  makes  delineating  seasons  difficult  because  of overlapping  crop cycles.  While
it is possible to separate out the naarai  crop from the rest becaue  of the distinct gap in the planting
periods, it is difficult  to separate  the two rainy-season  crops. Part of the problem  also  lies  in the starting
and ending dates of the two survey periods.  Considermg the short time between the planting dates of
sornavarai  and samba crops, there is considerable  overlapping in the crop cycles of the two crops.  The
allocation of land for the two seasons is thus likely to be joindy determined.
For the present parposes, the two rainy season crops are treated as a single stage I crop and
referred to as the samba season for convenience. Stage  11  of the sequential  household planning problem
thus includes the nayarai season and extends  from January to May of the agricultural year. Total samba
production is thus estimated  as the value of production  from all land planted prior to the month of January
in each survey period.  Total labor and capital inputs, and gross cropped area are also aggregated
accordingly for the purposes of production fimction estimation.  Diversification is defied  over area
allocated to different crops over the season.  The agricultura production shock is calculated  using the
value of total samba output for the two years.
It is probable that households respond to shocks in total income rather than to the prospect of
production shocks alone.  Accordingly, an alternative estimate of drought shocks is used to estimate
1Bhousehold behavioral response, based on total (farm and non-farm) income.  Annualized household
income is used to proxy stage I total income for lack of a  more appropriate estimates.
Econometric  SpecUication
To specify the essential  parameters  for estimation  it is sufficient  to concentrate  on equations (25),
(26) and (27). Equation (28) pertains to conditions of hypothetical insurance; as such a market did not
exist in the study area, it provides no insights to observed behavior and hence is treated here as an
analytical  tool.  Equation (29) requires  knowledge  of repayment  schedules  for households as well as data
on borrowing.  Since such information is not available, equation (29) is dropped from the empirical
model.
To  estfimate  the  remaining system,  infbrmation is  required on technology of  agricultural
production, Y(.), and expectations  of income shocks u(.) held at the beginning of stage I.  The former
requires estimating a production function and the latter the estimation  of a 'shock' equation.  Given data
on a single pair of drought and non-drought years, a two-step estimation procedure is adopted that
optimizes  the use of data.  In the first step, a shock equation is estimated  as a function of pre-determined
drought-year variables (i.e., initial endowments  and fixed farm characteristics).  Using the estimated
parameters,  predicdons for shocks  anticipated  at the beginning of the non-drought  year are obtained  using
the non-drought-year  values of pre-determined  variables.  In the second step, these predictions are used
along with production data for ihe non-drought year to estimate the rema  ining parameters.
Assuming that non-drought year farm income is representative  of the long run expected  income,
drought shock is defined as
==  - I-=i  - u  (33)
where rY, is income for a non-drought  year and srYd is income for a drought year.  Earlier, u(.) was
19hypothesized  to be a function of diversification. Since  diversification  is an endogenous choice variable,
reflecting anticipated  shocks among other things, a simultaneous  equation system is required to estimate
the strucural relationship between the two variables.  Although such a relationship  would be useful by
itself, it is not essendal for the purposes of this analysis. Accordingly, the shock equation is estimated
as a reduced form using available  fixed and pre-determined  variables. The main advantage  of doing this
is that it avoids imposing  structure on an instrumenting  regression which makes  predictions of  expected
shocks more straightforward.
The last equality  in (33) is used to esimate C, which represents drought year output as a ratio to
non-drought year output.  We use the logarithm of the output ratio u' as the dependent variable.  The
explanatory  variables used for this regression include village dummies and opening stoccs (of variable
inputs and food commodities),  fixed capital, family size, and farm characteristics  as of the beginning of
the drought year.  Using the estimated coefficients  and the values of the respective variables at the
beginning  of the non-drought  year yields an estimate,  Ing', from which the anticipated  shock for the non-
drought year,  A,  is calculated  as I-expon(nf.
The production function is specified with a Cobb-]Douglas  functional form:
log(Y)  =  )jz,f+aIog(Ljz)  +flog(kl)  +Olog(1-D,)  +v1og  (A1 ) +e  (34)
where Y is the value of anticipated  (non-drought)  output; Ln is total labor used on-farm; k, is working
capital input; A, is area cultivated;  D1 represents  diversification;  Gi is a dummy variable  for village i; z;,
a!, 6i, U  and v are parameters, and e is a random error term.  A Simpson index", defined over area
allocated to different crops, is used to measure on-farm diversification,  D1.
Given  production function (34), the behavioral  relations of interest, i.e., equations (25), (26) and
'A Simpson  index  of diversification  over xi, for all i, is defined  as D(x)=(1 - E;,(x/xA7.
20(27), can be rearranged to derive the following'  estimable equations
logt  =  log(a)  +log(1+i(1-,O)  ) -log(l+  )±ca  (35)
log[(]  =  log(fl)+log(l'+(l-,))-log(l+@)+wO  (36)
log((Dl)  = log(-y)  +log(1+0i(l-)  ) -log(q)  +COD  (37)
where u  is the predicted shock,  y=0/u'  and WL, cok  and wD are disturbances (with standard Gauss-
Markov assumptions) associated  with (35), (36) and (37), respectively. The left-hand-side  variables of
equations (35) and  (36) are logaitms  of the shares of labor and capital in total value of output,
respectively, and the left hand side of (37) is the logarithm of the diversification  index.  Given that the
production errors  enter multiplicatively in  (34),  and that the hypothesized drought shock  is also
multiplicative in (15), it is assumed tnat optimization, specification  or data-related errors are likely to
affect conditions (25)-(27) multiplicatively rather than additively.  Besides being more  robust to
specification errors, this structure also simplifies estimation somewhat.
These three equations  together with the production function (34) yield a simultaneous system.
Across-equation  restrictions are necessary  to identify all of the system parameters. Parameters a and f
are held as constants across the production  function (34) and equations (35) and (36), respectively. The
risk coefficient, X, is similarly restricted to be identical across equations (35), (36) and  (37).  The
coefficient  on the specialization  variable, 0, is estimated  unrestricted and is expected  to be positive9.
'Note  that  diversification,  D, is expected  to have  a negafive  effect  on output. However,  takng logariths  is
not possible  for  observations  on households  that  do  not diversify  (i.e. have  D=O).  Hence,  the  variable  included
in the specification  is (1-D)  which  represents  specialization.  Accordingly,  0,  the coefficient  on log(Q-D),  is
expected  to be positive.
21Parameter  y in equation  (37)  is also esdmated  freely. As  derived  from the first order conditions  above,
=Y 0
1 Iu4  It represents  the ratio of the marginal  effect  of diversification  on expected  output to the
marginal  effect  of diversification  on output  shock. Since  both effects  are hypothesized  to be negative,
y is expected  to be positive.
Labor, capital  and diversification  are variables  endogenous  to the system  (34)-(37)  and hence
instrumental  variable estimation  is necessary  for consistent  estimation. A three-stage  least squares
procedure,  with appropriate  cross-equation  parametric  restrictions,  is used to obtain consistent  and
efficient  estimates  (Judge, et al., 1985). Household  and farm characteristics  including  demographic
variables  and opening  inventories  are  used as instruments.  Labor and capital  are normalized  by area  to
avoid  collinearity  in the  production  function.  The estimated  coefficient  on the log of area, thus,  provides
a direct  test of constant  returns to scale (l::v= 1).
Resudrs  and  Discussion
The sample  used in this study is admittedly  small but the detailed  information  under drought
conditions  provides  a rare opporunity  to model  the effects  of drought  on household  incomes,  maldng  the
data particularly  useful for this analysis.  As mentioned  earlier,  the following  empirical  results  are
intended  to serve as an illustration. To corroborate  the findings  and to provide  additional  results, a
companion  study (Sakurai,  et al, 1994)  uses  panel data  collected  by the Interational Crops  Research
Institute  for the Semi-Arid  Tropics  (ICRISAM)  on rural households  from Burkdna  Faso.
Simple  statistics  for the variables  used  in the estimations  are given  in Table  1. Regression  results
for the output  ratio, u , are giveen  in Table  2. Note  from (33)  that  a larger  ratio  implies  a smaller  drought
effect. In terms of explanatory  power,  the regression  explains  58 percent  of total variation. The lack
of significance  of most coefficients,  however,  suggests  the presence  of collinearity.  This is verified  by
the regression  results  without  vilage dummy  variables,  also  reported  in Table  2.  Both  qualitatively  anu
22quantitatively  the results  are consistent  for the two specifications  with the exception  of a sign change  in
one insignificant  variable,  while  the significance  level of three key variables  improves  markedly  when
the village  dummy  variables  are omitued. The RP, however,  falls considerably. The formal  test of
exclusion  of the village  dummy  variables  is significant  at the 10%  level' 0. Since  the primary concern
with  this  instrumenting  regression  is consistent  prediction,  the  specification  with  village  dummy  variables
is  used  to predict  anticipated  drought  shocks  for estimating  the  main  parameters  of interest  (in  the second
step).
It should  be noted  that  there  are no clear  theoretical  priors for the  asset  variables.  The dependent
variable  is realized  shock,  and hence will be a function  of both the choice  behavior  of the household
(e.g., the shock may increase  with wealth indicating  a large risk-bearing  capacity  of the wealthier
households)  and the efficacy  of measures  adopted  by the household  (the shock  is expected  to decrease
with protective  measures).
The results show that households  owning  a greater number of wells experience  a smaller
production  shock,  as may  be expected.  The number  of owned  fragments  also  tends  to reduce  the shocc.
Fragmentation  implies  spatial  diversification  which  is likely  to be positively  related  to diversificaL  in and
hence the expected  positive effect on the drought-non-drought  output  ratio Ci.e.,  a negative  effect  on
production  shock). Value  of total land  owned  has a positive  effect  on the output ratio, i.e., a negative
effect  on the shock,  although,  it is relatively  insignificant.  Opening  stocks  have  a similar  effiect.  Larger
food  stocks  are  positively  correlated  with  diversification.  This suggests  that stocks  induce  households  to
diversify  their crop portfolio  which in turn helps  cushion  the effects  of drought  on total production.
Households  with  larger  fixed  farm capital  experienced  a greater  production  shock  as  reflected  by the large
and relatively  significant  negative  effect  on the output  ratio. This is perhaps  because  a large  proportion
"Mhe  F statisc  for the exclusion of the four village dummies is F(4,20)=2.41  which is significant at the
8% level.
23of fixed  capital is in the form of irrigation  equipment. While  such equipment  yields  large returns in non-
drought years, the shock is also pronounced  in drought  years when such equipment  is of little use.  An
increase in the average  distance of owned land (from  the village)  reduces  the output ratio, i.e., it tends
to increase  production  shocks. 'This  may  reflect  greater care  being  given to plots that are closer  to home,
reducing  the effects  of drought. Finally, family size has an insignificant  effect.
Table 3 presents results for the total income  shock equation. Note that the dependent  variable
for this regression is the ttal  household income  ratio in drought and non-drought  years and that the
specification  includes  two additional  variables,  value  of owned  business  capital  and a dummy  variable  for
illiterate  households.' 1 Overall,  the regression  for total income  shock performs better han the one for
production  shock, with an R 2 of 0.72.  The number of owned wells again has a significantly  positive
effect on the income ratio Ci.e., it reduces total income shock).  Number of fragments owned has a
negative  effect on the drought-non-drought  income ratio or a positive effect on the income shock. This
reflects a scale effect the number of land fragments  is positively  correlated  with total land owned. A
larger share of agriculture  in total income and a greater ability  to bear risks perhaps explains  this effect.
The same is also suggested  by the significantly  negative  effect of owned land value and opening stocks
on the income ratio, i.e., a positive  effect  on the income  shock. Farm fixed capital, ceterisparibus,  has
a positive effect on income  ratio (negative  effect  on income  shock). It should be noted  that total income
includes  income  from the navarai (irrigated)  crop grown  in the latter half of the agricultural  year. With
irrigation equipment  included in farm fixed capital, this result is not surprising.  An increase in the
distance  of plots from the village tends to increase  income  shocks, as in the case of production  shocks.
Family size, however,  has a negative  effect  on the income  ratio, or a positive effect on income  shocks,
as does the value of owned business capital. These signs, although  insignificant,  probably reflect the
" tThese  two  variables  were  omitted  fiom  the  production  shock  equation  because  of tehir  lack  in explanatory
power.
24widespread  effects of drought on the local economy. With agriculture  as the main activity in the study
area, a severe drought has a depressing effect on all activities  via intersectoral linkages.  This is also
reflected  in the large and highly significant  negative coefficient  on the dummy for illiterate  households
who are likely to rely more heavily on unskilled wage labor (Hazell, et al., 1991). Finally, one of the
village  dummies  is highly  significant  and consistent  in sign with the village effects  on production  shocks,
while the others are insignificant.  Thus there appears  to be some regional variation in the effects  of the
drought.
Turning now to the main parameters of interest, Tables 4 and 5 give the results for the model
represented by equations (34)-37) using predicted shocks for samba production and total income,
respectively. Using crop production data for the non-drought  year 1983-84,  Tables 4a and Sa present
results with dummy variables for four of the five villages in the production  function specification  (34),
while  Tables 4b and 5b present results without  the dummy  variables. Given the small sample  size, this
is done to check the robustness  of behavioral  and technology  parameters  against village-specific  effects.
In  the production funtcion, logariftms of variable inputs, labor and capital, and the  crop
specialization  index (i.e.  1-D) are treated as endogenous.  The estimation results for the first-stage
instrumenting  equations  for these variables are presented  in Appendix  B, Tables B. 1-B.3. The results
of these regressions  are not discussed  since  they are of not of immediate  interest. As is evident, with R 2s
of about 0.70, 0.85 and 0.57 for the three variables, respectively,  the instruments appear to explain a
substantial  proportion  of observed  variation. However, a limited  number  of observations  combined  with
moderate collinearity  generates large standard errors making it difficult  to establish the importance  of
individual  variables as identifying  variables.
The production elasticity parameters  for labor and capital are highly significant, and appear to
be robust to the production  function specification  with and without  village dummy variables as well as
to production  and income  shock  estimates. The coefficient  on area is positive  and insignificanty different
25from I in all specifications.
The specialization index, although positiv: in all regressions, is sensitive to village dummy
variables in the production shock specification.  The positive sign is as expected, suggesting that
specialization  (diversification)  increases (decreases)  expected output. The estimate is significant  in the
regression  without  village effects, but is insignificant  in the regression  with village effects. This suggests
that diversification  is correlated  with village-specific  effects. The significance  of the coefficient  on the
specialization  index in the two total income shock specifications  follows a similar pattern, although in
magnitude  the estimates  are close to the production  shock specification  estimate  without village dummy
variables.
The ratio of the marginal effect of diversification  on expected  production to its marginal effect
on production shock, 'y, is positive in all regressions as expected. It is also significantly less than one
in all cases, indicating  that the 'benefif of diversification  (i.e. the reduction in shock) is greater than its
'cost' (i.e., the reduction  of output). This parameter,  however, is also sensitive  to village-specific  effects
in the production  shock specification.
Finally, the parameter of chief ixterest in this study, the risk coefficient, qY1 The estimate is
0.50 (significant  at the 5% level) in the specification  with village effects,  and 0.25 (significant  at ihe  10%
level) in the specification  without village effects in the specifications  using predicted  samba production
shocks (rables 4a and 4b).  The change  in the magnitude  of the coefficient  suggests  an omitted  variables
bias in the specification  without  village fixed effects, considering  that at least one village  dummy is quite
significant  (at the 6% level). The rest of the discussion  is restricted  to the specification  with fixed effects.
In the specification using predicted total household income shocks in Tables 5a and 5b, the
"The reported  is estmatd  as a constant  and interpreted  as the  smple  mean. Alternative  specifications
were  tried  maing  5  a linear  f-tfio  of household  wealth  as well  as other household  charactedstics  such  as
fimily  size, age of household head, dummy  variable for illiterate  households  and owned business capital. None
of the  household  charctenstics  attaned sigmfiamce-  A quadrtic specfication  in initial  wealth  was  also tned
with similar  results. Since  these  regressions  do not add much  to the  discussion,  ftey have  not beea  presented.
26estimates  of # are 0.39 and 0.34, respectively,  with both significant  at the 5% level. The insignificance
of village effects  reflects  the insensitivity  of the coefficient  to the two specifications.  It should be noted
that despite  the differences  in the istrumenting equations  for the two shock  variables,  the risk parameter
estimates  using total income  shocks  are within  one standard  error of each  other as well as of the estimate
using  production  shocks  (with  village  effects),  indicating  that the # estimate  is robust across  the different
specifications. Since  total household  income  is likely to be less sensitive  to weather shoclk, one might
expect a lower estimate  for the risk coefficient  using the total income shock specification. As can be
seen, even though  the difference  is statistically  insignificant,  the estimates  using total income  shock are
quantitadvely  smaller than the estimate  using production  shocks.
One  way  to interpret  this coefficient,  as  nioted  earlier,  is as a ratio of the marginal-utility-weighted
probabilities  of drought (q') to non-drought  (Ii<  outcomes. The 0 estimates  of 0.50 and 0.39 imply
values of q" of about 0.33 and 0.28, respectively. These probabilities  should be compared  with the
actuarial probability of drought using historical  data.  As noted earlier, risk neutrality or complete
insurance  against  drought  shocks  Ci.e.,  for which  W%=W%),  imply q"  will be equal  to q, and households
will not exhibit any unmet demand for insurance. On the other hand, a q > q would indicate  such a
demand.
Using annual  rainfll  data from 1961-2 to 1984-85,  mean annual  rainfal is estmated at 1031
mm with a standard  deviation  of 223 (Ramasmy et al., 1991). The definition  of drought used is one
developed  by the Indian Meteorologic  (sc.) Department:  a drought is t... a situation occurring  in any
area in a year when annual rainfall  is less than 75% of normal' (quoted  from Rodgers  and Svendsen,
1991).  Using this definition,  the probability  of obseving a drought in any given year is 0.124 (or
12.4%). The utility weighted  probability  estimates  of 0.33 and 0.28 are both substandally  higher and
strongly  suggest  an unmet demand  for insurance  against  drought shocks.
To put these numbers  in perspective,  consider  the proportional  risk premiums  (PRP) associated
27with each q'.  A PRP is defined  as the difference  between  actuarial  expected  income  and utility-weighted
expectation  income as a proportion of the actuarial expected income.  Calculating  utility-weighted
A~~~~~~~~~~~~
expectation  as Yr={(l-qjY2+qY2,(1-u))  and actuarial expectation  as Ye={(l-Y2,+qY2.(1-u)}, the
PRP can  be simply  calculated  as 1-(Y  'N9,  which  reduces  to {(qu(Ci(q4}.  With the mean production
shock  experienced  by sample  households  of 0.74, and the mean total income  shock of 0.61, the PRPs  are
estimated  at 0.17 and 0.13, respectively,  for the corresponding  q"s.  This indicates  the sample  households
would  be willing  to pay 13-17%  as the premium  to purchase  extemal  insurance. Note  that this 'premium'
is in excess of the pure risk-cost of 0.124 that a risk-neutral  or a fully insured household would be
indifferent  to for an actuarially  fair insurance. Thus allowing  for reasonable  program  costs  (5-10%), such
an insurance  may be commercially  viable.
Binswanger and Sillers (1984) report mean proportional insurance premia using data from
Binswanger's  experimenta  study in southern  India (Binswanger,  1981). These  rangefromO.09-0.20  (for
'low' to 'high' payoff  games where 'low' payoffs  were Rs. 5 and high payoffs  were Rs. 500). Similar
mangnitudes  of risk premia (with a population mean relative risk premium of 0.14) have also been
reported  by Ande (19fl  for South  Indian  Rice producers  using econometric  risk attitude  estimates. The
estimated  risk premia from this study are quite comparable.
The results indicate  that agricultural  households  in the sample  exhibit significant  risk-avoidance
behavior. This suggests  there is a latent  demand  for better smoothing  mechanisms. Subject  to the  caveats
of sample and fiuetional form specificity,  based on the mean proportion  of income  that the households
are currently  'paying' as insurance  against  drought  outcomes,  it may  be concluded  that there is a potential
market in the study villages  for additional  (external)  insurance  against  droughts  at unsubsidized  premium
rates.  Since the premiums calculated  here are at sample  means, it is likely that there would be some
uptake if a scheme  such as a drought  or rainfall  lottery were to be introduced.
The analysis  in this paper is restricted to agricultural  households. Given the predominance  of
28agriculture in rural economies, droughts are likely to  have a significant effect on non-agricultural
activities  as well. It is thus possible that non-agricultural  households  (e.g., agricultural  wage earners and
local business  operators)  will also exhibit demand  for insurance against droughts. Based on exogenous
variables such as rainfall levels, as opposed  to endogenous  variables such as production  shortfalls, such
insurance  can be readily made accessible  to non-agricultural  households as well.
In drawing policy conclusions,,  it is important  to keep two issues in mind.  First, the definition
of the objective  probability  of drought.  Note that the estimated  risk-response  coefficients  do not depend
on the actual probability of drought; it is their interpretation  in determining  the demand for insurance,
i.e., the marginal premium the households vill be willing to pay, that requires,  a precise definition  of
drought.  The results indicate  that households  will be indifferent  to purchasing insurance at actuarially
fair premiuris for insurance  based on objective  drought probabilities of up to 33% and 28% (based on
estimates  of production shocks and total income shocks, respectively).
Second, the non-drought  year which is used to determine  the latent  demand  for insurance  followed
a drought year.  It is possible that risk coping  mechanisms  of households  were exhausted  by the end -of
1982-83  (the  drought year)  and, hence, household  behavior in 1983-84  (the  subsequent  non-drought  year)
may  reflect  greater risk avoidance  than may be observed  in other circumstances.  Thus, measured  demand
may be an over-estmate of the long-run average demand  for insurance. This is a generic issue with a
path-dependent  historic event  Nevertheless,  the results are indicative  of the inability of households  to
absorb drought shocks when they do occur.  Considering  that droughts are a recurrent event, one may
argue that there is a real, perhaps fluctuating, demand for smoothing mechanisms against droughts
outcomes.
29Summary
This paper develops a dynamic household  model to examine  the efficiency  of existing drought
management  strategies  used by peasant  households. An attractive  feature of the method is that it exploits
actual  production (input-output)  data without  having  to deal with the usually  unreliable  data on household
consumption  and leisure activities.
The model is applied to a two-year  panel of data on households  from five villages in the North
Arcot district of Tamil Nadu (South India). Although sample is small, the data are special in that one
of the two years for which data are available was a severe drought year. This provides an opportunity
to apply the model developed  in this paper. Subject  to the asmptions  about  the structure and fimctional
forms of the relationships used in this study, as well as the limitations imposed by the sample, the
conclusions  must be viewed as indicative rather than definitive. The key parameters, nevertheless, are
estimated  with sufficient precision and the implied  risk premia are plausible in comparison  with exsting
evidence  based on experimental  estimates  of risk-aversion  for households in similar circumstances.
The results indicate  that agricultural  households  exhibit significant  risk-avoidance  behavior, and
that even though they may use a range of risk management strategies, there still remains an unmet
demand for insurance against drought risks.  The study did not estimate  the likely costs of supplying
drought insurance, but the latent demand in the study region is found to be strong enough to more than
cover  the break-even  rate of approximately  the pure risk-cost (the probability  of drought) plus 5 percent
administration  costs.
The findings confm  the inadequacies  of traditional strategies of coping with drwghts in poor
nrual areas.  Because of catastrophic and simultaneous  effects  of droughts on all households over large
areas, there is limittxd  scope for spreading risks effectively at the local level.  Either households must
increase their savngs significanly (a problem with low average incomes and an absence of safe and
convenient  savings instuments), or more effectieve  risk management  aids are needed that can overcome
30the covariation  problem.  Improved  financial markets (with botli credit and savings facilities) could be
helpful, particularly if they intermediate  over a larger and more diverse economic  base than the local
economy.  Alternatively,  formal drought insurance  in the form of a drought (or rainfall) lottery might
be feasible, and the results suggest that it could  be sold on a full-cost  basis.  These conclusions  support
a case for firther research on other areas and for using more reliable data to provide further evidence
on.  the latent demand  for insurance in poor rural areas.
31References
Alderman,  H. and C. Paxson.  1992. "Do the Poor Insure? A Synthesis  of the Literature  on Risk and
Consumption  in Developing  Countries." Policy Research  Working Paper #1008, The World
Bank, Washington  D.C.
Anile, J.  1987.  "Econometric Estimation of  Producer's Risk Attitudes."  Amercan  Journal of
Agricultural  Economics,  69(3):509-522.
Antle, J. 1989. "Nonstructural  Risk Attitude  Estimation."  American  Journal  ofAgricultural  Economics,
71(3):774-784.
Bellman,  R. 1957. Dynamic  Programming.  Princeton  University  Press.
Benveniste, L.M.  tDd J.A. Scheinkman. 1979. 'On  the Differentiability  of the Value Function in
Dynamic Miodels  of Eoonomics'. Econometrica.  47(3):727-732.
Binswanger,  H.P.  1981. "Attitudes  Towards  Risk: Theoretical  Implications  of an Experiment  in Rural
India". Econonmc  Joumnal.  91:S67-890.
Binswanger,  HIP. and D.A. Sillers. 1983.  'Risk Aversion  and Credit Constraints  in Fanners' Decision-
Making: A Reinterpretation".  Journal  of Development  Studies.  21:5-21.
Dardanoni,  V. 1991. 'Precautionary  Savings  under Income Uncertainty:  A Cross-Sectional  Analysis'.
Applied Economics,  23:153-160.
Gudger, M.  1991. "Crop Insurance: Failure of the Public Sector and the Rise of the Private Sector
Alternative". In D. Holden, P. Hazell  and A. Pritchard  (eds.):  Risk in Agriculture:  Proceedings
of the Terth Agriculture  Sector Symposium.  1990,  The World  Bank, Washington,  D.C.
Hakansson,  N.H.  1970. 'Optimal Investment  and Consumption  Strategies  Under Risk for a Class of
Utility Functions". Econometrica. 38(5):587-607.
Hayashi,  F. 1985. "The  Effect of Liquidity  Constraints  on Consumption:  A Cross-Sectional  Analysis".
Quarterly  Journal  of Economics.  100:183-206.
Hazell, P.B.R.  1992. "The Appropriate Role of Agricultural  Isurance  in Developing Countries".
Journd of International  Development.  4(6):567-582.
Hazell, P., C. Pomerada  and A. Valdds. 1986. Crop Insurance  for Agricultural  Development. Johns
Hopkis  University  Press, Baltimore.
Hazell, P.B.R. and C.Ramasamy. 1991. The Green Revolution  Reconsidered:  The Impact of High-
Yielding  Rice Varieties  in South  India. John Hopkins  University  Press, Baltimore.
Hazell, P.B.R., C. Ramasamy,  V. Rajagopalan,  P.K. Aiyasamy  and Neal Blevin.  1991.  "Economic
Changes  Among  Village  Households"  in Hazell and Ramasamy  (1991).
32Jodha,  N.S. (1975).  "Famine  and  Famine  Policies:  Some  Empirical  Evidence".  Econommc  and  PolM  cat
Weeldy,  10:1609-23.
Judge, G.G., W.E. Griffiths,  R.C. Hill, H. Lutkepohl  aud T-C. Lee. 1985.  Theoq and Practice  of
Econometrics.  John  Wiley  and  Sons, New  York.
Matlon,  P. 1991. "Farmer  Risk  Management  Strategies:  The Case  of West-African  Semi-Arid  Tropics"  .
In D. Holden,  P. Hazell  and A. Pritcbard  (eds.):  Risk in Agriculture:  Proceedings  of the Tenth
Agnculture  Sector  Symposium.  1990,  The  World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C.
Moscardi,  E. and A. de Janvry. 1977. "Attitudes  Toward  Risk Among  Peasants:  An Econometric
Approach."  Amercan  Journal  ofAgriculta  Economics,  59(4):710-716.
Morduch,  J. 1990.  "Risk,  Production  and  Saving:  Theory  and  Evidence  from nian Households".  Dept.
of Economics,  Harvard  University.  Mimeo.
Ramasamy,  C., P.B.R. Hazell, and  P.K. Aiyasamy,  1991. "North  Arcot  and  the Green  Revolution"  in
Hazell  and  Ramasamy  (1991).
Rodgers,  C. and Mark  Svendsen.  1991.  "Objective  Assessment  of Drought  and  Agricultural  Impacts  of
Drought  in The Monsoonal  Climate  of South  India". Mimeo.  The International  Food Policy
Research  Institute,  Washington,  D.C.
Samuelson,  P.A. 1969 "Lifetime  Portfolio  Selection  by Dynamic  Stochastic  Programming".  The  Reiew
of Economics  and Staisics.  August: 239-246.
Singh,  I., L. Squires  and  J. Strauss.  1986.  Agricultural  Household  Models:  Extensions.  Applications  and
Plicy.  Johns  Hopkins  University  Press,  Baltimore.
Stokey,  N.L. and RE. Lucas. 1989.  Recursive  Methods  in Economic  Dvnamics. Harvard  University
Press, Cambridge,  Mass.
Sakurai,  T.., M. Gautam,  T. Reardon,  P. Hazell and H. Alderman.  1994. "Potential  Demand  for
Drought  Insurance  in Burina Faso."  - .Mim.,  Agricultural  Policies  Division,  Agriculture  and
Natural  Resources  Department,  The World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C.
Walker,  T.S. and  N.S. Jodha.  1986.  "How  Small  Farms  Adapt  to Risk".  In P. Hazell,  C. Pomerada  and
A. Valdes  (1986)
Zeldes, S.  1989a.  Optimal Consumption  with Stochastic  Income: Deviations  fiom Certainty
Equivalence". QuarterlyJowunu  of Economics. 104(2):275-298.
Zeldes,  S. 1989b. "Consumption  and Liquidity  Constraints;  An Empirical  Investigation".  Jornas of
Political Economy. 97(2):305-347.
33Table 1: Sanple Descriptive  Statistics 1
f  Variable  Mean  C.V.
Samba Agricultural  Production  (Rs.)  9136  121.2
Labor Share  0.299  55.5
Capital  Share  0.325  56.0
Cultivated  Area (Acres)  5.488  141.1
Labor/Acre  (Rs.)  572.5  53.8
Capital/Acre  (Rs.)  621.9  57.4
Specialization  Index  0.702  33.9
Samba  Agricultural  Production  Shock  0.737  35.3
Total Household  Income  Shock  0.612  35.6
Annual Agculthral  Production  (Rs.)  12041  118.5
Total Household  Income (Rs.)  9354  125.4
Initial  Wealth (Rs.)  67948  114.5
Opening  Stocks (Rs.)  803.7  166.4
Owned  Livestock  Value (Rs.)  1720  65.9
Farm Fixed Capital  (Rs.)  6493  228.7
Value of Total Land Owned  (Rs.)  45526  123.6
Value of Owned  Business  Capital  (Rs.)  4059  323.4
Proportion of Total Area Irrigated  0.395  88.1
No. of Owned  Wells  1.063  53.1
No. of Owned  Fragments  4.750  84.2
Avg. Distance  of Owned  Plots from Village (Km.)  0.807  108.6
Dummy for Illiterate  Household  0.153  240.5
Age of Household  Head (years)  47.90  18.2
Family Size  6.031  28.1
'Values reported are for the year 1983-84  with the exception  of shock variables which are as
defined in the text.
34Table 2: Samba  Production  Shock  Equation  Estimates'
Variable  With  Village  Effects  Without  Village  Effects
Constant  -2.052  -2.836
(0.84Th  (0.795)
Village  Dummy  2  -1.299
(0.726)
Village  Dummy  3  -0.145
(0.803)
Village  Dummy  4  0.288
(1.026)
Village  Dummy  5  -0.809
(0.740)
Value  of Land  Owned/10000  0.011  -0.029
(0.039)  (0.041)
No. of Fragments  Owned  0.041  0.075
(0.073)  (0.050)
No. of Wells  Owned  0.561  0.821
(0.437)  (0.377)
Farm  Fixed  Capital/10000  -0.274  -0.374
(0.143)  (0.150)
Avg.  Plot  Distance  -0.306  -0.183
(0.333)  (0.245)
Opening  Stocks/1000  0.101  0.183
(0.250)  (0.243)
Family  Size  0.069  0.071
(0.096)  (0.101)
_2  0.589  0.392
'Dependent  variable  is log of  the ratio  of drought  to non-drought  year  total  value  of samba  crop
output. The explanatory  variables  are drought  year  values  (in  levels).
2Standard  errors  reported  in parentheses-




Village Dummy 2  -1.438
(0.444)
Village Dummy 3  0.306
(0.524)
Yillage Dummy 4  -0.294
(0.556)
Village Dummy 5  -0.404
(0.443)
Value of Land Owned/10000  -0.059
(0.026)
No. of Fragments Owned  -0.063
(0.045)
No. of Wells Owned  0.652
(0.322)
Farm  Fixed  Capital/10000  0.133
(0.182)
Avg.  Plot Distance  -0.157
(0.199)
Opening Stocks/1000  -0.029
(0.178)
Family  Size  -0.058
(0.062)
Owned  Business  Capital/1000  -0.112
(0.675)
Dummy for Illiterate  RH  -1.686
(0.445)
R2  0.724
'Dependent  variable is log of the ratio of drought to non-drought  year total annualized  household
income. The explanatory  variables are drought year values (in levels).
2Standard  errors reported in parentheses.Table 4a: Effect  or Anticipated  Samba  Production  Shock
on Input Decisions  - with Village  Effects
[  Variable  Parameter  Estimate  Std. Error
Constant  z  3.059  0.701
Village  Dummy  2  z2  0.011  0.258
Village  Dummy  3  z3  0.101  0.243
Village  Dummy  4  z4  0.324  0.201
Village  Dummy  5  z5  0.428  0.213
Labor  0.331  0.049
Capital  0.381  0.046
I-Diversification  0  0.059  0.473
Area  v  0.899  0.093
(aYIOD)I/(8uID)  y  0.292  0.118
Risk  Coefficient  0.504  0.229
Table  4b: Effect of Anticipated  Samba  Production Shock
on  Input Decisions  - without  Village  Effects
Variable  Parameter  Estimate  Std. Error
Constant  z  3.764  0.499
Labor  0.291  0.037
Capital  0.343  0.035
1-Diversification  0  0.477  0.229
Area  1.006  0.059
(aY18D)/(8uIBD)  0  0.156  0.084
Risk Coefficient  0.251  0.145
37Table Sa:  Effect  of Antidpated Annual Total Income  Shock
on Input Decisions  - with Village Effects
r  Variable  Parameter  Estimate  Std. Error
Constant  z  3.804  0.513
Village Dumm-' 2  z2  -0.015  0.296
Village Dummy 3  z3  0.049  0.276
Village Dummy 4  z4  0.057  0.203
Village Dummy 5  zS  0.225  0.205
Labor  a  0.291  0.036
Capital  0.336  0.032
1-Diversification  0  0.439  0.526
Area  p  0.946  0.107
(aYIaD)I(auIaD)  y  0.217  0.088
Risk Coefficient  +  0.394  0.191
Table Sb: Effect of Anticipated Annual Total Income  Shock
on Input Decisions - without Village Effects
j  Variable  Parameter  Estimate  Std. Error
Constant  z  3.838  0.443
Labor  a  0.287  0.034
Capital  U  0.334  0.030
1-Diversification  9  0.467  0.227
Area  1.008  0.062




Several  countries  have  publicly  operated  crop insurance  programs  that  provide  insurance  against
drought  as one of many insured  yield perils.  But without  exception,  these  programs  have required
massive  subsidies  from govemment  and they  have  not proved  particularly  effective  in protecting  farm
incomes  against  droughts.
The  basic  reason  why  most  publicly-operated  crop  insurance  programs  lose  money  is because  they
insure yields against  a wide range of perils, many  of which  are subject  to severe moral hazard and
adverse  selection  problems. This problem  is typically  compounded  by features  of insitutitonal  and
program design that increase  the insurer's risk exposure  (e.g., the insurance  portfolio is tied to
agricultural  credit  programs,  realistic  deductibles  are not  equired,  and  indemnitites  are  valued  on the basis
of shortfalls  from  target  yeilds  rather than  on actual  crop  damage);  see Gudger  (1991)  and  Hazell  (1992)
for recent  reviews  of public  crop insurance.
Commercial  crop insurance,  which  has to be financially  viable  to survive,  is invariably  limited
to very specific  perils  that satisfy  four insurability  conditions: Ci)  the likelihood  of the event  must be
readily quantiable;  Cii)  the damage  it causes  must be easy to attribute  and value; (iii) neither the
occurrence  of the event  nor the damage  it causes  should  be affected  by the insured's behavior  (i.e.,
absence  of moral  hazard);  and  (iv)  the event  should  not occur  so  frequendy  that  farmers-  canot  realistically
afford  the required  premiums.
Crop losses due  to extreme  droughts  can  be insurable  when  judged  by these  criteria,  particularly
if the damage  is total. In fact, private insurers  do offer drought  insurance  in a number  of countries,
though  because  of the high administration  costs incurred  when  insuring  smal!-scale  farmers,  it is rarely
extended  to other  than  large-scale,  commercial  fanners. Insurance  of less extreme  shortfalls  in rainfall
is more  problematic,  since  losses  are only partial  and moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection  problems  can
arise. For example,  if the shortfall  is due  to poor rains  after  planting,  the farmer  can  affect  the amount
of damage  through  fertilization,  weeding  and  harvesting  practices.
In order  to harness  drought  insurance  as a more  general  risk management  aid  for drought-prone
regions,  several  objectives  must be met.
First, the insurance  must be readily accessible  to all kinds of households; small and large
farmers,  landless  laborers,  shopkeepers,  agricultural  merchants  and  processors,  artisans,  etc. This  means
that insurance  contracts  cannot  be tied solely  to crop or livestock  production.
Second, the insurance  must be affordable,  particularly  by poor people.  This implies that
administration  costs must be kept very low; and that only drought events that occur with some
infrequency  (say 1 or 2 in 10 years)  can be reasonably  insured.
Thlid, since  drought  damage  within  a region  tends  to be highly  covariate,  drought  insurance  will
only  be fianncially  viable  if a mechanism  exists  to spread  the risk beyond  the insured  region. In a large
39country, this might be achieved by  insuring many regions, particularly if these have low or even
negatively correlated rainfall pattems.  But more generally, it is necessary  to establish arrangements  for
reinsurance or contingent  loans with the government  or with private banking and insurance institutions.
New forms of drought insurance can be designed which meet thse objectives whilst satisfying
essential insurability conditions.
A New Approach to Drought Insurance
The drought insurance  envisaged  here would be weather-station  specific, and al persons insuring
against  the rainfall at a specific station would pay the same premium and receive  the same indemnity  per
dollar of insurance. Indemnities  would be paid whever the station's cumulative  rainfall for some specified
period of the year (say an agricultural season) fell below an agreed 'drought' level (elel, 70 percent of
average). Premiums would be calculated  on the basis of the probability of a drought occurring, on the
size of the indemnity to be paid, and on administration costs.  For example, for a station faced with a
one year in ten drought and an insurance administration cost of 10 percent, a $1.00 insurance ticket
would pay out approxinately $9.00 in the event of a drought (i.e., the expected  premium collected over
ten years minus the 10 percent administration  cost). The calculation  is approximate  because no allowance
has been made for expected interest earnings on  accumulated  premiums held by the insurere, or for
reinsurance costs.
Drought insurance tickets could be marketed rather like lottery tickets, employing low-income
people to sell the tickets on a commission  basis. Unlike standard insurance, however, all ticket holders
for a given weather station would receive an indemnity in a drought year, but no indemnity would be
given in non-drought  years.  If the scheme  is managed  by a commercial  bank, then the indemnitites could
be issued through its local brance offices after suitable announcements  in the lcoal press, radio and.
television.
Since all participants would pay the same premium and receive the same indemnity, drought
insurance avoids all moral hazard and adverse  selection  problems. Moreover, since the insurance is not
tied to agricultural output, participation does not have to be restricted to farmers.  In fact, many types
of  rural households might  find it attractive.  Nor need the emergence of  a  secondary market be
discouraged, since this would enable cash-strappped  individuals  to  obtain their expected  prizes (albeit,
at a discount)  prior to the end of the monitored raifall period. Finally, since thei nrance does not require
any contract wirnig  with individuals, or any field inspections or loss assessments, administration costs
could be kept very low (perhaps at 2 to 3 percent of the ticket value).
There are at least three potential problems with the proposed insurance.  First,  its value as a
drought-coping  aid depends on whether catastrophic  income outcomes  for most households coincide  with
severe droughts at nearby weather stations.  This  is more likely to be true the greater  a region's
dependence  on agriculture, but it also depends on the number and geographic dispersion of the weather
stations  used in defining  the insurance. NOte that since individual  households  would be free to purchase
tickets for any insured weather station, they would have considerable  scope  to exploit less than perfectly
correlated drought risks to tailor insurance  portfolios to their individual income risks.
Second, there could be difficulties  in measuring  the cumlative rainfall over the specified period
if large numbers of local people have an interst in a low reading.  Guarding the weather stations is
40expensive,  nor would  it necessarioly  be successful  since  the guards  might acquire a financial  interest
themselves.  The problem  might  be reduced  by narrowing  the time  period  over which  readings  must  be
taken  to key periods  in growth  of important  Ical crops. Some  recent  work at ICRISAT,  for example;
suggests  that  the date  of onset  of the  monsoon  is an excellent  indicator  of the agricultural  production  value
of the ensuing  monsoon. This could  be a very insurable  event. Another  promising  approach  is to use
soil-moisture  content  readings  as a proxy  for rainfall  deficiency,  perhaps  even  defining  drought  in texms
of soild  moistue contnet  rather than in terms of cumulative  rainfall. Soil moisture  readings  could  be
randomly  sampled  in much  the same  way  that crop-cutting  methods  are used  to estimate  regional  yields.
Third, the drought  insurance  proposed  here  faces  an even  more extreme  covariability  problem
than  conventional  drought  insurance.  This is because  all  the participants  receive  the same  indemnity  per
dollar of ticket and  at the same  time. Under  these conditions,  an insurance  for a single  weather  station
is almost  equivalent  to a group  savings  scheme  in which  households  save  in non-drought  years  and  simply
receive  their money  back  in drought  years. However,  there are two important  differences.  First, in a
pure savings  scheme,  the amount  of money  available  in a drought  year is determined  solely by the
cumulated  savings  since the last drought. But with the insurance,  the available  funds  depend  on the
expected  value of the total savings  that can be accumulated  between  droughts;  that is, the indemnities
from the insurance  do not depend  on the order in which  drought  years occur.  This feature of the
insurance  can  only work  if the insurer  either  runds  a number  of weather  station  insurances  that are less
than  perfectly  correlated,  or has access  to reinsurance  or contingency  loan  arrangements.  Either  approach
effectively  expeands  the reserves  available  to be tapped  in drought  years.  SEcond,  if the insurer is
adequately  diversified  or reinsured,  the amounts  of liquid reserves  that need to be carried can be
considerably  less than  with  a private  savings  shceme. This increases  the scope  for eaniing  larger  returns
on the nonliquid  share  of toal reserves.
I  the insurance  is to succeed  in helping  the poor cope with droughts,  it would  be especially
important  to market  the  tickets  to this clientele.  To the extent  that  thfe  poor are overdy  more  risk averse,
then  the insurance  should  be pardy self  targeting. However,  since  poor people  often  might  not be able
to afford  the premium,  subsidized  tickets  would  enhance  their auractiveness.  Such subsidies  might be
funded  by diverting  some  govenment  funds  from existing  crop insurance  or drought  relief  programs.
41Appendix B: First-Stage (Instrumenting) Equations
Table B.1: Labor Input'
Variable  Estimate  Std. Error
Constant  6.046  0.770
Village Dummy 2  -0.054  0.426
Village Dummy 3  0.476  0.419
Village Dummy 4  -0.038  0.369
Village Dummy 5  -0.280  0.398
Value of Land Owned(10000  -0.093  0.017
Proportion Area Irrigated  0.128  0.412
Farm Fixed Capital/10000  0.163  0.053
Livestock Value/10000  1.590  0.839
Family Size  0.085  0.056
No. of Owned  Fragments  -0.008  0.031
Average Plot Distance  -0.451  0.126
Age (of Household Head)  -0.0002  0.007
Dummy for No Education  0.060  0.294
R2  0.B75  -
'Dependent variable is log of labor input per acre.
42Table B.2: Capital Input'
Variable  Estimate  Std. Error
Constant  4.773  0.781
Village Dummy 2  0.147  0.432
Village Dummy 3  0.410  0.424
Village Dummy 4  1.033.  0.375
Village Dummy 5  0.689  0.403
Value of Land Owned/10000  -0.073  0.017
Proportion Area Irrigated  0.117  0.427
Farm Fixed Capital/10000  0.125  0.053
Livestock Value/10000  2.990  0.851
Family Size  0.109  0.564
No. of Owned  Fragments  0.010  0.031
Average Plot Distance  -0.313  0.127
Age (of Household  Head)  0.006  0.008
Dummy forNo Education  0.200  0.298
R2  0.768  -
'Dependent variable is log of capital input per acre.
43Table B.3: Crop Specialization Index 1
Variable  Estimate  Std. Error
Constant  -1.017  0.672
Village Dummy 2  0.126  0.372
Vilage Dummy 3  0.109  0.365
Village Dummy 4  0.409  0.322
Village Dummy 5  0.491  0.347
Value of Land Owned/10000  -0.022  0.014
Proportion Area Irrigated  0.575  0.359
Farm Fixed Capital/10000  0.012  0.046
Livestock ValuellO000  0.418  0.732
Family Size  -0.006  0.048
No. of Land Fragments (owned)  0.022  0.026
Average Plot distance  -0.201  0.109
Age (of Household Head)  0.006  0.007
Dummy for No Education  -0.061  0.257
R2  0.596  -
'Dependent variable is log of crop specialition  index.  Crop specialization  is defined as 1-D,
where D is a Simpson index for  crop diversification.
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